II-1
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<strong>2.1 OF THE IN AND DESIGN OF GOVER IN GENERAL.</strong><strong>WITH CISE REMARKS ON THE ENGLISH STITUTION</strong>
Some writers have so founded society with gover, as to leave little or no distin between them; whereas they are not only different, but have different ins.
Society is produced by our wants, and gover by our wiess; the former promotes our POSITIVELY by uniting our affes, the latter IVELY by restraining our vices. The one ences intercourse, the other creates distins.
The first a patron, the last a punisher.
Society in every state is a blessing, but gover even in its best state is but a necessary evil; in its worst state an intolerable one; for when we suffer, or are exposed to the same miseries BY A GOVER, which we might expe a try WITHOUT GOVER, our calamity is heightened by refleg that we furnish the means by which we suffer.
Gover, like dress, is the badge of lost innoce; the palaces of kings are built on the ruins of the bowers of paradise. For were the impulses of sce clear, uniform, and irresistibly obeyed, man would need no other lawgiver; but that not being the case, he finds it necessary to surrender up a part of his property to furnish means for the prote of the rest; and this he is io do by the same prudence whi every other case advises him out of two evils to choose the least. WHEREFORE, security being the true design and end of gover, it unanswerably follows, that whatever FORM thereof appears most likely to e to us, with the least expense and greatest be, is preferable to all others.
In order to gain a clear and just idea of the design and end of gover, let us suppose a small number of persoled in some sequestered part of the earth, unected with the rest, they will then represent the first peopling of any try, or of the world.
In this state of natural liberty, society will be their first thought.
A thousand motives will excite them thereto, the strength of one man is so unequal to his wants, and his mind so unfitted for perpetual solitude, that he is soon obliged to seek assistand relief of another, who in his turn requires the same. Four or five united would be able to raise a tolerable dwelling in the midst of a wilder<s>9９lib.</s>ness, but one man might labour out of the on period of life without aplishing any thing; when he had felled his timber he could not remove it, it after it was removed; hunger in the mean time would urge him from his work, and every different want call him a different way. Disease, nay even misfortune would be death, for though her might be mortal, yet either would disable him from living, and reduce him to a state in which he might rather be said to perish than to die.
Thus y, like a gravitating power, would soon form our newly arrived emigrants into society, the reciprocal blessings of which, would supersede, and rehe obligations of law and gover unnecessary while they remained perfectly just to each other; but as nothing but heaven is imprego vice, it will unavoidably happen, that in proportion as they surmount the first difficulties of emigration, which bound them together in a on cause, they will begin to relax in their duty and attat to each other; and this remissness will point out the y of establishing some form of govero supply the defeoral virtue.
Some veree will afford them a State-House, uhe branches of which, the whole ay assemble to deliberate on public matters.
It is more than probable that their first laws will have the title only ULATIONS, and be enforced by no other penalty than public disesteem.
In this first parliament every man, by natural right, will have a seat.
But as the y increases, the publis will increase likewise, and the dista which the members may be separated, will re too inve for all of them to meet on every occasion as at first, when their number was small, their habitations near, and the publis few and trifling.
This will point out the venience of their senting to leave the legislative part to be managed by a seleumber chosen from the whole body, who are supposed to have the same s at stake which those oihem, and who will a the same manner as the whole body would act, were they present.
If the y tinues increasing, it will bee necessary to augment the number of the representatives, and that the i of every part of the ay be atteo, it will be fouo divide the whole into ve parts, each part sending its proper number; and that the ELECTED might never form to themselves an i separate from the ELECTORS, prudence will point out the propriety of haviions often; because as the ELECTED might by that meaurn and mix again with the general body of the ELECTORS in a few months, their fidelity to the public will be secured by the prudent refle of not making a rod for themselves. And as this frequent interge will establish a on i with every part of the unity, they will mutually and naturally support each other, and on this (not on the unmeaning name of king) depends the STRENGTH OF GOVER, AND THE HAPPINESS OF THE GOVERNED.
Here then is the in and rise of gover; namely, a mode rendered necessary by the inability of moral virtue to govern the world; here too is the design and end of gover, viz. freedom and security.
And however our eyes may be dazzled with show, or our ears deceived by sound; however prejudice may our wills, or i darken our uanding, the simple voice of nature and of reason will say, it is right.
I draw my idea of the form of gover from a principle in nature, whio art overturn, viz. that the more simple any thing is, the less liable it is to be disordered; and the easier repaired when disordered; and with this maxim in view, I offer a few remarks on the so much boasted stitution of England. That it was noble for the dark and slavish times in which it was erected, is granted.
When the world was overrun with tyranny the least remove therefrom was a glorious rescue. But that it is imperfect, subject to vulsions, and incapable of produg what it seems to promise, is easily demonstrated.
Absolute govers (tho the disgrace of human nature) have this advah them, that they are simple; if the people suffer, they know the head from which their suffering springs, know likewise the remedy, and are not bewildered by a variety of causes and cures.
But the stitution of England is so exceedingly plex, that the nation may suffer for years together without being able to discover in which part the fault lies; some will say in one and some in another, and every political physi will advise a different medie.
I know it is difficult to get over local or long standing prejudices, yet if we will suffer ourselves to examihe po parts of the English stitution, we shall find them to be the base remains of two ayrannies, pounded with some new republi materials.
FIRST - The remains of monarchial tyranny in the person of th<cite>?99lｉb?</cite>e king.
SEDLY - The remains of aristocratical tyranny in the persons of the peers.
THIRDLY - The new republi materials in the persons of the ons, on whose virtue depends the freedom of England.
The two first, by being hereditary, are indepe of the people; wherefore in a STITUTIONAL SEhey tribute nothing towards the freedom of the state.
To say that the stitution of England is a UNION of three powers reciprocally CHEG each other, is farcical, either the words have no meaning, or they are flat tradis.
To say that the ons is a check upon the king, presupposes two things: FIRST - That the king is not to be trusted without being looked after, or in other words, that a thirst for absolute power is the natural disease of monarchy.
SEDLY - That the ons, by being appointed for that purpose, are either wiser or more worthy of fidehan the .
But as the same stitution which gives the ons a power to check the king by withholding the supplies, gives afterwards the king a power to check the ons, by emp him to reject their other bills; it again supposes that the king is wiser than those whom it has already supposed to be wiser than him. A mere absurdity! There is something exceedingly ridiculous in the position of monarchy; it first excludes a man from the means of informatio empowers him to a cases where the highest judgment is required. The state of a king shuts him from the world, yet the business of a king requires him to know it thhly; wherefore the different parts, by unnaturally opposing aroying each other, prove the whole character to be absurd and useless.
Some writers have explaihe English stitution thus: The king, say they, is ohe people ahe peers are a house in behalf of the king, the ons in behalf of the people; but this hath all the distins of a house divided against itself; and though the expressions be pleasantly arranged, yet when examihey appear idle and ambiguous; and it will always happen, that the stru that words are capable of, when applied to the description of some thing which either ot exist, or is too inprehensible to be within the pass of description, will be words of sound only, and though they may amuse the ear, they ot inform the mind, for this explanation includes a previous question, viz.
HOW CAME THE KING BY A POWER WHICH THE PEOPLE ARE AFRAID TO TRUST, AND ALWAYS OBLIGED TO CHECK? Such a power could not be the gift of a wise people, her any power, WHIEEDS CHEG, be from God; yet the provision, which the stitution makes, supposes such a power to exist.
But the provision is unequal to the task; the meaher ot or will not aplish the end, and the whole affair is a felo de se; for as the greater weight will always carry up the less, and as all the wheels of a mae are put in motion by o only remains to know which power in the stitution has the most weight, for that will govern; and though the others, or a part of them, may clog, or, as the phrase is, check the rapidity of its motio so long as they ot stop it, their endeavours will be iual; the first moving power will at last have its way, and what it wants in speed, is supplied by time.
That the is this overbearing part in the English stitution, needs not be mentioned, and that it derives its whole sequence merely from being the giver of places and pensions, is self-evident, wherefore, though we have been wise enough to shut and lock a dainst absolute monarchy, we at the same time have been foolish enough to put the in possession of the key.
The prejudice of Englishmen in favour of their own gover by king, lords, and ons, arises as muore from national pride than reason.
Individuals are undoubtedly safer in England than in some other tries, but the WILL of the king is as much the LAW of the land in Britain as in France, with this differehat instead of proceeding directly from his mouth, it is hao the people uhe more formidable shape of an act of parliament. For the fate of Charles the First hath only made kings more subtle - not mo<cite></cite>re just.
Wherefore, laying aside all national pride and prejudi favour of modes and forms, the plain truth is, that IT IS WHOLLY OWING TO THE STITUTION OF THE PEOPLE, AND NOT TO THE STITUTION OF THE GOVER, that the is not as oppressive in England as in Turkey.
An inquiry into the STITUTIONAL ERRORS in the English form of gover is at this time highly necessary; for as we are never in a proper dition of doing justice to others, while we tinue uhe influence of some leading partiality, so her are able of doing it to ourselves while we remaiered by any obstinate prejudice.
And as a man. who is attached to a prostitute, is unfitted to choose or judge a wife, so any prepossession in favour of a rotten stitution of gover will disable us from dising a good one.
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